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LET ME BE QUEER:
THE NEED FOR LGBT PROTECTIONS IN
INDIANA
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2015, Indiana Governor Mike Pence signed the state’s Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) into effect.1 This bill allows individuals
and companies to claim their religious beliefs as a defense in legal
proceedings by stating that their religious beliefs have been, or are likely
to be, burdened by providing some service or good.2 As a result, the
LGBT+ (LGBT) community interpreted the passing of this bill as a direct
attack on their rights and freedom. 3 Their fears were confirmed when a
pizza restaurant in Walkerton, Indiana announced a week after the
passage of the bill that they would refuse to cater any wedding for a samesex couple.4
In July 2014, just days after the federal court struck down Indiana's
law prohibiting gay marriages, Mark G. Ahearn, chief counsel to
Governor Mike Pence, issued a memo to all executive branches outlining
Indiana’s position.5 The memo stated that Indiana's law against same-sex
marriages "is in full force and effect and executive branch agencies are to
execute their functions as though the U.S. District Court order of June 25
had not been issued."6 In Indiana, this decision struck down Indiana’s law
forbidding gay marriages, resulting in several hundred same-sex
marriages.7 While it seemed like a great victory, it took just two days for

1
See IND. CODE § 34-13-9 (describing Indiana’s infamous Religious Freedom Restoration
Act). See also IND. CODE § 34-13-9-0.7 (observing the “fix” that Indiana added to the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, which was meant to prevent discrimination based on sexual
orientation).
2
See IND. CODE § 34-13-9 (conveying Indiana’s RFRA discriminatory purpose and effect
on LGBT citizens).
3
See Kristine Guerra, How Indiana's RFRA differs from federal version, INDIANAPOLIS STAR
(Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2015/03/31/indianasrfra-similar-federal-rfra/70729888/ [https://perma.cc/WD2A-VS7B] (observing the outcry
by LGBT citizens of Indiana who were concerned for their rights).
4
See id. (describing the state and national story of a pizza shop owner who refused to
cater a same-sex couple’s wedding, justifying his refusal using RFRA).
5
See Barb Berggoetz, Indiana Won't Recognize Last Month's Same-Sex Marriages,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR (July 9, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/
07/09/gay-marriage-indiana/12412667/ [https://perma.cc/2ATL-ZDCK] (pointing out the
chief counsel’s position in opposition to same-sex marriage).
6
Id.
7
See id.
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the Court of Appeals to stay the ruling.8 This memo simply confirmed the
governor of Indiana’s refusal to recognize the legality of the several
hundred same-sex marriages that occurred over those few days.9
In March 2016, Indiana attempted to pass a bill that would prevent
cities and other local government entities from passing nondiscrimination
protections that are greater than the protections offered at the state level. 10
The bill failed, but the rights provided by these cities and counties would
have been eliminated if the bill had passed. 11 The North Carolina
legislature argued a similar bill in March 2016, however the bill passed
and was put into law in that state.12
Fortunately, the marriage equality issue changed with the
monumental Supreme Court decision in Obergefell and the discriminatory
bill eliminating local protections failed.13 In addition, RFRA was amended
to provide limited protections for the LGBT community. 14 However, an
underlying problem remains: Indiana lacks comprehensive protections
for the LGBT community.15
The simplest and most effective way for Indiana to protect its LGBT
citizens from discrimination would be by simply amending its Civil
Rights Act.16 This Note proposes that Indiana amend its Civil Rights Act
and add “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” to the list of protected
groups because current LGBT citizens lack comprehensive, state-wide
protections, which leaves these citizens susceptible to discrimination. 17
Next, Part II describes the various federal, state, and local protections for
8
See Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 672 (7th Cir. 2014) (staying the district court’s decision
to allow same-sex marriages in Indiana). See also Berggoetz, supra note 5 (reviewing the
Court of Appeal’s decision to stay the ruling).
9
See Berggoetz, supra note 5.
10
See S.B. 100, 119th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2016) (describing the bill in Indiana
that failed in the Senate but that would have eliminated local city and county protections for
the LGBT community).
11
Id.
12
Compare S.B. 100, 119th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2016) (portraying Indiana’s
failure to pass the Senate Bill eliminating local city and county protections for the LGBT
community), with Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, H.B. 2, 2016 Sess. L. 3 (N.C. 2016)
(discussing North Carolina’s legislature enacting the discriminatory bill).
13
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015) (“The Court, in this decision, holds
same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States.”). See also S.B.
100, 119th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2016) (observing the failed Senate Bill).
14
See IND. CODE § 34-13-9-0.7 (exploring RFRA’s fix, which added language preventing
businesses and organizations from discriminating based on sexual orientation).
15
See IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2 (listing the groups protected by the Indiana Civil Rights Act,
of which “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” are not included).
16
See infra Part IV.B.
17
See infra Part IV (proposing an amendment to Indiana’s Civil Rights Act, Ind. Code § 229-1-2, which would prevent discrimination against these groups in all the areas listed in the
Act).
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LGBT citizens in Indiana.18 Part III then analyzes the need for increased
protections based on current discrimination and a review of the various
levels of court scrutiny.19 Part IV proposes an amendment to Indiana’s
Civil Rights Act, Ind. Code § 22-9-1-2, adding “sexual orientation” and
“gender identity” to the list of protected groups.20 Finally, Part V
concludes by summarizing the pertinent information set forth in this Note
and recommends the Indiana legislature vote to amend its Civil Rights
Act.21
II. BACKGROUND
Throughout the country, the LGBT community has been in the public
eye, especially in recent years, due to a push for total and complete
equality under the law.22 As a result, rights have been addressed from
legal viewpoints, with opponents and proponents of equal rights and
protections for the LGBT community vocalizing their opinions.23 Because
these rights are so heavily and openly discussed today, it is important to
look at where the law currently stands in Indiana regarding the LGBT
community.24
18
See infra Part II (providing information necessary to understand the issue of LGBT
discrimination in Indiana and the protections that currently exist).
19
See infra Part III (analyzing the current law in the state regarding the LGBT community,
the counterarguments of proponents of religious liberties and freedom, and the benefits of
adding protections).
20
See infra Part IV.
21
See infra Part V.
22
See, e.g., Guerra, supra note 3 (portraying the state and national outcry in response to
Governor Pence signing RFRA into effect). See also Berggoetz, supra note 5 (describing
Governor Pence’s refusal to allow same-sex marriage to be legalized in 2014 and
emphasizing his memo, which stated that he was devoted to maintaining traditional
marriage in Indiana).
23
See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 359 (7th Cir. 2017) (exploring
the Seventh Circuit case prohibiting employment discrimination based solely on sexual
orientation). The court decided discrimination based on sexual orientation was forbidden
because it fell under “sex” as a protected group. Id. See also INDIANAPOLIS, MARION COUNTY,
INDIANA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 581-101 (2016) [hereinafter ORD. § 581] (identifying
counties, such as Marion County, which provide protections for the LGBT community
greater than those the state of Indiana provides); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2585
(2015) (legalizing gay marriage throughout the country by analyzing marriage as a
fundamental right); Mariga v. Flint, 822 N.E.2d 620, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (analyzing the
Indiana Court of Appeals case allowing a homosexual adoptive parent visitation rights to a
child born to same-sex parents).
24
See, e.g., ORD. § 581, supra note 23 (expressing that some Indiana counties and cities,
such as Marion County, provide increased protections for their LGBT citizens). This code
section added “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” to its list of protected groups,
therefore preventing discrimination against these groups in various areas under the law. Id.
See also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607. See also Mariga, 822 N.E.2d at 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)
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First, Part II.A introduces both Indiana’s current Civil Rights Act and
Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Laws.25 Second, Part II.B describes the
current “patchwork” of protections that prevent discrimination against
the LGBT community in Indiana.26 Part II.C then discusses the various
oppositions to providing protections, generally under the guise of
“religious liberties” or “religious freedom.”27 Finally, Part II.D addresses
the varying levels of scrutiny a court uses in its equal protection analysis. 28
A. Indiana’s Civil Rights Act
The Indiana Civil Rights Act currently protects against discrimination
“based solely on race, religion, color, sex, disability, national origin, or
ancestry,” as articulated in § 22-9-1-2 of the Indiana Code.29 The Act states:
(a) It is the public policy of the state to provide all of its
citizens equal opportunity for education, employment,
access to public conveniences and accommodations, and
acquisition through purchase or rental of real property,
including but not limited to housing, and to eliminate
segregation or separation based solely on race, religion,
color, sex, disability, national origin, or ancestry, since
such segregation is an impediment to equal opportunity.
Equal education and employment opportunities and
equal access to and use of public accommodations and
equal opportunity for acquisition of real property are
hereby declared to be civil rights.
(b) The practice of denying these rights to properly
qualified persons by reason of the race, religion, color,
sex, disability, national origin, or ancestry, of such person
is contrary to the principles of freedom and equality of
opportunity and is a burden to the objectives of the public
policy of this state and shall be considered as
discriminatory practices.
The promotion of equal
opportunity without regard to race, religion, color, sex,
(recognizing a surprising Indiana Court of Appeals case allowing a homosexual mother to
have visitation rights to her adopted child, despite objections by the biological mother).
25
See infra Part II.A.
26
See infra Part II.B (describing the various protections that are provided to LGBT citizens
of Indiana at the federal, state, and local level).
27
See infra Part II.C.
28
See infra Part II.D.
29
See IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2 (listing the groups protected by the Indiana Civil Rights Act,
of which “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” are not included).
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disability, national origin, or ancestry, through
reasonable methods is the purpose of this chapter.
....
(d) It is hereby declared to be contrary to the public policy
of the state and an unlawful practice for any person, for
profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or
rent any dwelling by representations regarding the entry
or prospective entry into the neighborhood of a person or
persons of a particular race, religion, color, sex, disability,
national origin, or ancestry.30
Amongst the various protections provided to the protected groups is the
right of “access to public conveniences and accommodations.”31
According to the “definitions” section under Indiana Code § 22-9-1-3,
“‘[p]ublic accommodation’ means any establishment that caters or offers
its services or facilities or goods to the general public.” 32
Unlike Indiana, Colorado’s Civil Rights Act added “sexual
orientation” to the list of protected groups. 33 While it does not explicitly
add “gender identity” to the list of protected groups, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24Id.
See IND. CODE § 22-9-1-3(m) (‘“Public accommodation’ means any establishment that
caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public.”). Unlike Colorado’s
definition, Indiana’s definition of “public accommodation” is very short and concise. See also
Justin Muehlmeyer, Toward a New Age of Consumer Access Rights: Creating Space in the Public
Accommodation for the LGBT Community, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 781, 783 (2013) (“At the
center of this debate is the definition of the term ‘public accommodation’ under the state civil
rights acts; it is the definition of this term that determines whether a state can enforce the
civil rights law against private establishments like the Hope Christian preschool.”).
32
Compare IND. CODE § 22-9-1-3(m) (defining the term “public accommodations” as used
throughout the Indiana Civil Rights Act), with COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2) (observing
Colorado’s definition of “place of public accommodation” as used throughout the Colorado
Civil Rights Act). Unlike Colorado, Indiana’s definition is very short and precise. Colorado
specifically lists areas that are considered public accommodations. However, both
definitions make the same point. If a business or entity offers a product or service to the
public, they will not be allowed to discriminate against protected groups based solely on
those characteristics.
33
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (establishing the Colorado Civil Rights Act, which
prevents discrimination because of disability, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation,
marital status, national origin, or ancestry in a place of public accommodation). See also
Lucien J. Dhooge, Public Accommodation Statutes and Sexual Orientation: Should There Be a
Religious Exemption for Secular Businesses?, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 319, 344 (2015)
(describing that despite protections provided for LGBT citizens in states like Colorado, many
of these protections still exclude those areas that are closely tied to religion). “For example,
Colorado's statute specifically excludes churches, synagogues, mosques and other places
principally used for religious purposes.” Id. at 344–45.
30
31
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34-301(7) defines “sexual orientation,” which includes “transgender status
or another individual's perception thereof.”34 This makes it unlawful to
deny someone, based solely on sexual orientation or gender identity, “the
full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation.” 35
B. The “Patchwork” of Protections
Without protections under Indiana’s Civil Rights Act, the LGBT
community in Indiana is provided only a patchwork of protections from
discrimination.36 These protections come in the form of amendments,
court cases, and executive orders.37 Section II.B.1 defines the various
protections and how they achieve the goal of preventing discrimination
based on sexual orientation and gender identity.38 Section II.B.2 discusses
the various state law protections that prevent discrimination. 39 Finally,
Section II.B.3 acknowledges several county and city protections in Indiana
shielding the LGBT community from discrimination. 40

See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-301(7) (“‘Sexual orientation’ means an individual's
orientation toward heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, or transgender status or
another individual's perception thereof.”).
35
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2). Subsection 1 states:
As used in this part 6, “place of public accommodation” means any
place of business engaged in any sales to the public and any place
offering services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations
to the public, including but not limited to any business offering
wholesale or retail sales to the public; any place to eat, drink, sleep, or
rest, or any combination thereof . . . .
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(1).
36
See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 345, 350 (7th Cir. 2017)
(reporting the federal case prohibiting employment discrimination based on sexual
orientation). See also ORD. § 581, supra note 23 (reviewing county and city ordinances,
including counties like Marion County, which provide more protections for the LGBT
community than the state does); Mariga v. Flint, 822 N.E.2d 620, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)
(analyzing the Indiana Court of Appeals case that allowed an adoptive mother visitation
rights to the child against the will of the biological mother).
37
See, e.g., CITY OF CARMEL, INDIANA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 6-8(a) City
Nondiscrimination Policy (2016) [hereinafter ORD. § 6-8] (“[N]o person, corporation,
partnership, company, or other individual or entity located within, or conducting business
within, the City’s corporate limits shall discriminate . . . on the basis of the latter’s race, color,
religion, national origin, gender, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression,
family or marital status, ancestry, age, and/or veteran status.”). See also Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015) (considering the landmark Supreme Court case that
legalized gay marriage throughout the country by stating that marriage is a fundamental
right available to same-sex couples).
38
See infra Section II.B.1.
39
See infra Section II.B.2.
40
See infra Section II.B.3.
34
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Federal Protections

The federal courts have provided numerous protections and assisted
the LGBT community throughout the country in achieving equality in
recent years.41 In Windsor, the Supreme Court, with Justice Kennedy
writing for the majority, declared the Defense of Marriage Act
unconstitutional.42 The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was a bill
passed in Congress that declared marriage as only between a man and a
woman.43 Edith Windsor, who was considered legally married to her wife
in New York and other states, was unable to receive an estate tax waiver
available to married couples under federal law after her wife passed
away.44 This was because the federal government refused to recognize her
marriage in accordance with DOMA. 45 In his opinion, Justice Kennedy
reasoned that “DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York seeks to

41
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (clarifying that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
decided that discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity is prohibited
because they are protected under the category of “sex”). See also Hively, 853 F.3d at 350
(interpreting the Seventh Circuit decision that concluded similarly to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission). The court decided that discrimination based on sexual
orientation was forbidden because it fell under “sex” as a protected group. Id. at 351–52. See
also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596.
42
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2681 (2013). See also Russell K. Robinson,
Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 199–200 (2016) (conveying the cases of Windsor and
Obergefell, particularly focusing on Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence in these cases).
Robinson gets into a very interesting discussion about differences in Justice Kennedy’s
voting record in cases involving equal protection claims. Id. at 198. In Robinson’s research
regarding Justice Kennedy’s voting record, “we found a clear divergence between race and
sex cases, on the one hand, and sexual orientation cases on the other.” Id. at 199. The research
found that in nonunanimous cases, Justice Kennedy cast liberal votes 33% of the time when
it came to race, 15% of the time when it came to gender, and 75% of the time when it came to
sexual orientation case. Id. at 199–200.
43
See Defense of Marriage Act, 1996 Enacted H.R. 3396, 104 Enacted H.R. 3396, 110 Stat.
2419 (declaring marriage as only between one man and one woman). See also Jeffrey L.
Rensberger, Same-Sex Marriage and the Defense of Marriage Act: A Deviant View of an Experiment
in Full Faith and Credit, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 409, 410–11 (1998) (“The critics contend that to
the extent the Defense of Marriage Act attempts to lower that floor, to allow states to give
less faith and credit to sister-state law and judgments than the first sentence of the clause
requires, it is an improper attempt to amend the constitution by legislation.”).
44
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (concluding that DOMA is unconstitutional). See also Dale
Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 204 (2013)
(explaining that Windsor may actually be less about equal protection, and more about a
newer concept being referred to as the animus test). Instead of seeing Windsor as a
substantive liberty or conventional equal protection decision, it should be seen primarily as
an animus case. Id. at 203.
45
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683 (“Windsor paid $363,053 in estate taxes and sought a
refund. The Internal Revenue Service denied the refund, concluding that, under DOMA,
Windsor was not a ‘surviving spouse.’”).
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protect. By doing so it violates basic due process and equal protection
principles applicable to the Federal Government.” 46
In Obergefell, the Supreme Court, with Justice Kennedy again writing
for the majority, decided marriage is a fundamental right and, as a result,
legalized same-sex marriage throughout the United States.47 In this case,
several same-sex couples and a few individuals whose partners were
deceased brought equal protection claims based on various injuries
associated with the lack of legal recognition for their marriages. 48 The
court analyzed this case by looking at fundamental rights and considering
whether or not marriage was considered to be a fundamental right. 49
Justice Kennedy, after looking at whether or not marriage was something
“based in history and tradition,” determined that marriage was in fact a
fundamental right.50 Same-sex couples therefore have the legal right to
Id. at 2693. Justice Kennedy wrote:
DOMA's unusual deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing and
accepting state definitions of marriage here operates to deprive samesex couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come with the
federal recognition of their marriages. This is strong evidence of a law
having the purpose and effect of disapproval of that class. The avowed
purpose and practical effect of the law here in question are to impose a
disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into
same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the
States.
Id. at 2694.
47
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (“[T]he Court also must hold—
and it now does hold—that there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful
same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character.”).
48
See id. at 2594 (reviewing the landmark case where James Obergefell and several other
same-sex couples or individuals whose partner had passed away sought access to the state
and federal protections that come with marriage). Obergefell’s partner, John Arthur, was
diagnosed with ALS, and the two men decided to marry before Arthur died from the disease.
Id. They traveled to Maryland because same-sex marriage was legal in the state. Id. Because
it was so difficult for Arthur to move, the two were married in the medical transport plane.
Id. Arthur passed away two months later; however, Ohio law did not allow Obergefell to be
listed as Arthur’s surviving spouse, which Obergefell described as “hurtful for the rest of
time.” Id. at 2594–95.
49
See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608. “[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent
in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that
liberty.” Id. at 2604.
50
See id. at 2602 (highlighting Justice Kennedy’s discussion of history and tradition in his
analysis of marriage as a fundamental right). See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
(discussing the Virginia case where the Court decided that interracial marriage laws violated
the petitioners’ due process rights). In this case, marriage between whites and blacks was
considered illegal in Virginia and fifteen other states. Id. at 6–7. The Court decided:
Marriage is one of the “basic civil rights of man,” fundamental to our
very existence and survival. To deny this fundamental freedom on so
unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these
46
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marry, and receive all of the state and federal benefits that come along
with that right.51
In Hively, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals declared that
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation violated the Civil
Rights Act.52 In this case, Ms. Hively was employed at Ivy Tech College,
but her employment was terminated.53 Ms. Hively was out openly to the
public, including her employer, as a lesbian.54 Ms. Hively was successful
in proving that her employment was terminated with her sexual
orientation as a consideration. 55 The court here stated that this type of
discrimination violated the Civil Rights Act because sexual orientation fell
under the umbrella of “sex,” and was therefore a protected class under the

statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality
at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the
State's citizens of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be
restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution,
the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides
with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.
Id. at 12.
See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608 (evaluating the holding of this landmark Supreme Court
case that legalized gay marriage throughout the country and provided these same-sex
couples with equal rights under the law).
52
See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 352 (7th Cir. 2017) (“We hold only
that a person who alleges that she experienced employment discrimination on the basis of
her sexual orientation has put forth a case of sex discrimination for Title VII purposes.”). The
court decided discrimination based on sexual orientation was forbidden because it fell under
“sex” as a protected class. Id. Hively was an openly lesbian part-time professor at Ivy Tech
Community College in Indiana. Id. at 341. Hively applied to numerous full-time positions
but was never allowed to move to these positions. Id. After years of trying, Ivy Tech
eventually refused to renew Hively’s contract for even part-time employment. Id. After
Hively filed suit claiming she was being discriminated against due to her sexual orientation,
the district court granted Ivy Tech’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted based on sexual orientation not being a protected class. Id. at 342.
53
See Hively, 853 F.3d at 341 (“Believing that Ivy Tech was spurning her because of her
sexual orientation, she filed a pro se charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission on December 13, 2013.”).
54
See id. (“[W]e conclude today that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a
form of sex discrimination.”). See also Stephanie Pisko, (Un?)Lawful Religious Discrimination,
9 DREXEL L. REV. 101, 128 (2016) (“It is possible that Congress will eventually amend Title VII
to comport with this trend and explicitly protect LGBT employees under Title VII.”).
55
See Hively, 853 F.3d at 341 (portraying that Ms. Hively’s sexual orientation was a
consideration of Ivy Tech Community College in their decision to deny her promotion and
eventually terminate her).
51
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Act.56 Indiana itself has provided its own protections in addition to the
federal protections discussed above.57
2.

Indiana State Protections

While Indiana courts have made decisions—and the Indiana
legislature has passed bills—that conflict with the rights of LGBT citizens
in the state, both have also made moves that provide protections for these
citizens.58 As will be discussed later, Indiana showed its preference for the
religious liberties movement when it passed RFRA in 2014.59 As a result
of this Act, a pizza restaurant was allowed to refuse service to a same-sex
couple because the restaurant owner claimed his religious liberties
allowed him to refuse this service.60 Based on public policy considerations
similar to those listed in Section II.D.1, Governor Pence and the Indiana
legislature amended RFRA and incorporated language prohibiting this

56
See id. at 351–52 (holding that sexual orientation is a protected class in the Seventh
Circuit because it is included under the category of “sex”).
57
See, e.g., ORD. § 581, supra note 23 (highlighting Marion County and the City of
Indianapolis adding “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” to their list of classes
protected from discrimination). See also Mariga v. Flint, 822 N.E.2d 620, 633 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005) (examining this surprisingly progressive Indiana case where the Court of Appeals
found the Circuit Court had the authority to grant the adoptive mother’s adoption, despite
being a same-sex couple).
58
See, e.g., Shalyn L. Caulley, Note, The Next Frontier to LGBT Equality: Securing Workplace
Discrimination Protections, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 909, 944–45 (2017) (analyzing various forms of
state legislation and how they can help cure issues of LGBT discrimination in light of RFRAs).
Caulley explains, “State legislation is by far the best protection currently in place. The laws
empower LGBT workers to seek legal recourse if they experience discrimination and provide
additional penalties to violators, such as jail time or fines.” Id. at 944.
59
See IND. CODE § 34-13-9. Though there was later a “fix,” this was a huge basis for
discrimination in Indiana. Id.
60
See Susanna Kim, Indiana Pizza Restaurant Says It Wouldn't Cater a Gay Wedding, Supports
Religious Freedom Law, ABC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/indianapizza-restaurant-cater-gay-wedding-supports-religious/story?id=30045085
[https://perma.cc/5NAB-69BE] (considering the pizza restaurant who made national news
after refusing to cater a same-sex couple’s wedding, citing to RFRA as a defense). The owners
of Memories Pizza in Walkerton, Indiana, told ABC news that they would serve same-sex
couples in the restaurant, however they refused to cater a same-sex wedding because
catering the wedding would violate their religious beliefs. Id.
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type of discrimination based on sexual orientation. 61 This was considered
a “fix” to the Act.62
The Indiana Court of Appeals was surprisingly progressive regarding
LGBT visitation rights for adoptive parents of the same sex. 63 In the early
2000s, prior to the landmark case of Obergefell, one woman in a same-sex
relationship adopted the other woman’s biological children.64 The
relationship failed, and as a result the biological mother moved to another
state with the children.65 After seeking visitation rights with the adopted
children, the court granted the adoptive mother visitation rights.66
3.

Local City and County Protections

In addition to the federal and state protections discussed above, many
Indiana cities and counties have taken various measures to prevent
discrimination based on sexual orientation.67 One such county that
61
See IND. CODE § 34-13-9. See also Rachel Johnson Hammersmith, Comment, Equality
Trumps Religion: Why Indiana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Inherently Promoting
Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 109 (2016) (outlining the backlash
states had as rights for LGBT citizens increased in order to protect the religious rights of their
citizens). “Due to the language of Indiana's RFRA and the fact Indiana had no statewide ban
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, many were concerned businesses
could once again be permitted to discriminate based on individual characteristics.” Id. at
110–11.
62
See IND. CODE § 34-13-9-0.7 (observing the “fix” that Indiana added to the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, which added minimal protections against discrimination).
63
See, e.g., Mariga v. Flint, 822 N.E.2d 620, 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining the case
allowing visitation rights to a child born to same-sex parents).
64
See id. (explaining the case allowing visitation rights to a child born to same-sex
parents). In this case, Lori and her children’s biological father divorced, at which point Lori
and Julie began a romantic relationship. Id. at 624. The children's biological father agreed to
terminate his parental rights to permit Julie to adopt the children without terminating Lori's
parental rights. Id. Lori left and married a second husband, and the Indiana Court of
Appeals stated that Julie was still entitled to parental rights. Id. The court stated:
This case requires us to examine the nature of parenthood. Whether a
parent is a man or a woman, homosexual or heterosexual, or adoptive
or biological, in assuming that role, a person also assumes certain
responsibilities, obligations, and duties. That person may not simply
choose to shed the parental mantle because it becomes inconvenient,
seems ill-advised in retrospect, or becomes burdensome because of a
deterioration in the relationship with the children's other parent.
Id. at 622–23.
65
See Mariga, 822 N.E.2d at 624 (“Lori moved to Georgia with her husband and children
because her husband was promoted by his employer and transferred to Georgia.”).
66
See id. at 633 (“As to Julie's petition to vacate the adoption of her children, we find that
the Circuit Court had authority to grant her petition for adoption in 1997, and it was not
procured by fraud.”).
67
See supra Section II.A.1 (explaining the various protections provided to the LGBT
community throughout the United States by the federal courts); supra Section II.A.2

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press,

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 1 [], Art. 7

220

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

provides these increased protections in Indiana is Marion County.68 A
second example is the City of Carmel, which passed an ordinance
protecting the LGBT community from discrimination by creating a system
that imposes warnings and fines against businesses discriminating based
on sexual orientation.69
These protections vary in strength from city to city and from county
to county.70 Some cities and counties have enacted ordinances that
prevent discrimination only based on sexual orientation. 71 Others have
enacted ordinances that prevent discrimination based on both sexual
orientation and gender identity.72 Some cities even have executive orders
in place to prevent discrimination based on both sexual orientation and

(conveying the various protections provided to the LGBT community throughout the state
of Indiana).
68
See ORD. § 581, supra note 23 (2016) (illustrating ordinances in Marion County and the
City of Indianapolis, which added “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” to the list of
groups protected from discrimination).
69
See ORD. § 6-8, supra note 37 (underlining the city’s addition of “sexual identification”
and “gender identity or expression” to the classes protected from discrimination). See also
Chris Sikich, Carmel narrowly passes LGBT protections, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Oct. 5, 2015),
https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2015/10/06/carmel-city-council-passes-antidiscrimination-ordinance/73400716/ [https://perma.cc/HX49-EK52] (explaining the
system of warnings and fines that will result if a business or entity discriminates against any
of the protected groups based on the protected characteristics).
70
See Stephanie Wang, How Local LGBT Anti-discrimination Laws Vary in Indiana,
INDIANAPOLIS
STAR
(Sept.
23,
2015),
https://www.indystar.com/story/
news/politics/2015/09/22/local-lgbt-anti-discrimination-laws-vary-indiana/72651754/
[https://perma.cc/HJ99-FE6K] (conveying the effects of various local city and county
protections for the LGBT communities in Indiana). According to the article, a total of fifteen
Indiana communities had antidiscrimination ordinances that included sexual orientation
and gender identity. Id. In addition, the mayors of Martinsville and Goshen have pursued
executive orders. Id.
71
See CITY OF HAMMOND, INDIANA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 37.053 Discrimination in
Public Accommodations (2016) (“It shall be unlawful for any person or establishment which
caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public to discriminate against
anyone.”). Unlike those of Marion County and the City of Carmel, Hammond’s ordinance
simply limits discrimination to anyone rather than specifically listing “sexual orientation”
and “gender identity.” Id.
72
See, e.g., The Herald Bulletin, Anderson Joins Indiana Cities Protecting LGBT Rights,
INDIANAPOLIS
STAR
(Dec.
24,
2015),
https://www.indystar.com/story/
news/politics/2015/12/24/anderson-joins-indiana-cities-protecting-lgbt-rights/77892944/
[https://perma.cc/4ES2-SB7R]
(discussing
Andersonville’s
ordinance
banning
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity). “The ordinance extends local
protections on housing, education, employment and public accommodations.” Id. See also
ORD. § 581 (identifying ordinances in Marion County and the City of Indianapolis, which
prevent discrimination based solely on sexual orientation or gender identity).
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gender identity.73 These variations represent the current patchwork of
insufficient LGBT protections in Indiana.
C. The LGBT Community, Religious Liberties, and a History of Discrimination
The proponents of religious liberties are the largest opposition to
providing protections to the LGBT community in both Indiana and
throughout the United States.74 Part II.C discusses three legal actions that
have either eliminated or attempted to eliminate protections based on
sexual orientation or gender identity with religious liberties as a
justification.75 First, Section II.C.1 addresses Indiana’s RFRA.76 Section
II.C.2 then discusses Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc.77 Finally, Section
II.C.3 describes Indiana Family Institute v. City of Carmel, Indiana, an
ongoing case in Indiana that is attempting to eliminate city and county
protections for the LGBT community.78
1.

Indiana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act

As referenced in this Note’s introduction, in 2015, Governor Mike
Pence of Indiana signed the state’s RFRA into effect.79 This bill allowed
See Wang, supra note 70 (examining how the mayors of both Martinsville and Goshen
have issued executive orders that prevent discrimination based solely on sexual orientation
and gender identity).
74
See, e.g., Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015), cert.
granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290
(June 26, 2017) (analyzing the case in which a baker discriminated against a same-sex couple
by refusing to bake them a cake). See also Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief, Ind. Family Institute v. Carmel, Indiana, No. 29D01-1512-MI-10207 (Ind. Hamilton
Cty. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Verified Compl., Ind. Family Inst.] (describing the
complaint filed by several religious groups in Indiana that challenges the “fix” to RFRA
banning discrimination and local ordinances preventing discrimination based on sexual
orientation or gender identity).
75
See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-13-9 (scrutinizing Indiana’s infamous RFRA, which was signed
into law by Governor Pence and allows religious groups to discriminate by claiming their
religious liberties are being violated). See also IND. CODE § 4-13-9-0.7 (examining the “fix”
that Indiana added to RFRA that prevents discrimination based solely on sexual orientation);
Verified Compl., Ind. Family Inst., supra note 74 (interpreting the Indiana case in which
religious freedom groups are trying to eliminate city and county protections for the LGBT
community).
76
See infra Section II.B.1 (discussing Indiana’s RFRA, which allowed private businesses to
discriminate based on sexual orientation).
77
See infra Section II.B.2 (describing the Mullins case).
78
See infra Section II.B.3 (conveying details about the case of Indiana Family Institute v. City
of Carmel, Indiana, which was allowed to proceed in Indiana courts).
79
See IND. CODE § 34-13-9 (authorizing Indiana’s infamous RFRA). See also IND. CODE
§ 34-13-9-0.7. However, LGBT individuals were not happy with the solution. The fix hardly
corrected the issue of potential discrimination against the LGBT community based on
religious liberties justifications.
73
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individuals and companies to assert that their exercise of religion has
been, or is likely to be, substantially burdened as a defense in legal
proceedings. LGBT citizens feared that this would allow private
businesses to discriminate against them with no repercussions or
protections.80 The LGBT community’s fears were confirmed when
Memories Pizza in Indiana came out publicly and stated it would not cater
a same-sex wedding.81 The owner refused to cater the wedding, stating
that he believed marriage was meant to be between a man and a woman. 82
He asserted that this conviction was based on his religious beliefs and that
he held these beliefs dearly.83 As a result, he refused to cater a gay
wedding and stated that doing so would be a substantial burden on his
religious beliefs.84
When corporations heard of the RFRA, they saw it as government
approval to discriminate against LGBT individuals. 85 As a result, the
corporations reacted negatively.86 After the RFRA was signed, many large
corporations and organizations in Indiana threatened to leave if this
80
See IND. CODE § 34-13-9 (discussing Indiana’s RFRA allowing a person to assert
religious beliefs as a defense after violating a discrimination law). The statute states:
A person whose exercise of religion has been substantially burdened, or
is likely to be substantially burdened, by a violation of this chapter may
assert the violation or impending violation as a claim or defense in a
judicial or administrative proceeding, regardless of whether the state or
any other governmental entity is a party to the proceeding.
IND. CODE § 34-13-9. See also Guerra, supra note 3 (interpreting Indiana’s RFRA
and the ways it allows people and businesses to legally discriminate).
81
See Cavan Sieczkowski, That Anti-Gay Indiana Pizzeria That Received $840,000? This
‘Pizza’ Supports the LGBT Community, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 6, 2015),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/06/equality-house-virtual-pizza_n_70101
90.html [https://perma.cc/CA8M-NAZ8] (describing the Indiana pizza restaurant that
stated it would refuse to cater a gay wedding and would use Indiana’s RFRA for protection).
82
See Tom Coyne, Pizza Shop That Backed Indiana Religious Freedom Law Reopens, TIME
(2015), http://time.com/3816667/indiana-religious-freedom-law-pizza-shop/ [https://
perma.cc/HMU9-D322] (outlining the backlash Memories Pizza experienced when they
refused to cater a same-sex wedding); Sieczkowski, supra note 81 (describing the owner of
the pizza restaurant’s ability to raise $840,000 when the owners faced backlash for refusing
to serve the same-sex couple).
83
See Sieczkowski, supra note 81 (“The law, which many have condemned for promoting
discrimination against LGBT people, allows individuals and businesses to cite religious
beliefs as a defense when sued by a private party.”).
84
See Sieczkowski, supra note 81 (reciting Crystal O’Connor’s additional comment that
“God has blessed us for standing up for what we believe, and not denying him”).
85
See Tim Evans, Angie's List Canceling Eastside Expansion Over RFRA, INDIANAPOLIS STAR
(Mar. 28, 2015), https://www.indystar.com/story/money/2015/03/28/angies-listcanceling-eastside-expansion-rfra/70590738/ [https://perma.cc/PZN6-Y5HN].
86
See Eric Rosenbaum, The Business Case Against Indiana’s Religious Faith, CNBC (Mar. 26,
2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/03/26/the-business-case-against-indianas-religiousact.html [https://perma.cc/VPN8-ZSKM] (asserting reactions of large corporations and
businesses to Governor Pence signing the RFRA into effect).
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blatant discrimination was allowed based on religious justifications. 87
Among these corporations and organizations are the NCAA, Angie’s List,
and Subaru.88 A prime example of economic backlash came from the
NCAA, which stated that this law may affect future events and job
opportunities in Indiana.89 Because the NCAA is “deeply committed to
providing an inclusive environment for all [its] events,” the organization
stated that it would need to see the implications of the act.90 At that point
it would make a decision about future events in the state. 91 Luckily, the
“fix” to the RFRA was enacted before any assessment of future events was
required.92
87
See, e.g., Rosenbaum, supra note 86 (discussing the various corporations who threatened
to leave Indiana as a result of RFRA). Large corporations who joined in the discussion
include Yelp, PayPal, and the NCAA. Id. There is also a discussion about the amount of
talent that would likely leave the state as the result of the discriminatory act. Id.
88
See Kay Steiger, The Growing Backlash Against Indiana’s New LGBT Discrimination Law,
THINK PROGRESS (Mar. 27, 2015), https://thinkprogress.org/the-growing-backlash-againstindianas-new-lgbt-discrimination-law-68727eff4f02/
[https://perma.cc/9U2W-6BEH]
(observing various corporations and organizations who threatened to leave Indiana as a
result of the discriminatory act). See also Matthew Belvedere, NCAA President: Indiana Law
Against Our Core Values, CNBC (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/03/31/ncaapresident-indiana-law-against-our-core-values.html
[https://perma.cc/R4XE-MUVS]
(describing the NCAA president’s concern that the RFRA goes against the organization’s
“core values”). “It's important to us because we're an employer here in this state. But most
importantly . . . it strikes at the core values of inclusion and diversity.” Id. See also Evans,
supra note 85 (conveying Angie’s List’s dedication to tolerance and opposition to RFRA).
Angie’s List’s co-founder and chief executive officer Bill Oesterle said, “Angie's List is open
to all and discriminates against none . . . and we are hugely disappointed in what this bill
represents.” Id.
89
See Mark Alesia, NCAA: 'Religious Freedom' Law Creates Concern for Future Events,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.indystar.com/story/sports/college/
2015/03/26/ncaa-indiana-religious-freedom-law-mike-pence-mark-emmert-final-fourindianapolis/70490096/ [https://perma.cc/DS45-WBK7] (outlining the reaction of the
NCAA in regard to Indiana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act in which the NCAA
threatened to pull business from the state).
90
Mark Emmert, Statement on Indiana RFRA Updated Language, NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/statement-indiana-rfraupdated-language [https://perma.cc/9J2T-MKJH]. Mark Emmert, the NCAA president,
released this statement regarding the updated language:
We are very pleased the Indiana legislature is taking action to amend
Senate Bill 101 so that it is clear individuals cannot be discriminated
against. NCAA core values call for an environment that is inclusive and
non-discriminatory for our student-athletes, membership, fans, staff
and their families. We look forward to the amended bill being passed
quickly and signed into law expeditiously by the governor.
Id.
91
See Alesia, supra note 89 (highlighting the NCAA’s serious consideration to leave
Indiana based on RFRA and the discrimination that would come with it).
92
See IND. CODE § 34-13-9-0.7 (outlining the amendment to RFRA that allegedly fixed the
issue of discrimination based on sexual orientation). The amendment states:
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Based on the negative outcry regarding RFRA, Governor Pence and
the state government of Indiana amended RFRA and incorporated
language prohibiting this type of discrimination based on sexual
orientation.93 This was considered a “fix” to the Act.94 Neither side
considered this “fix” to be perfect, even though it successfully limited the
government in discriminating in a private setting.95 This has led to groups
asserting their religious freedom protections in the form of legal action in
Indiana.96
2.

Potential Elimination of Local Protections for the LGBT Community

Groups and individuals in Indiana have attempted to eliminate local
city and county LGBT protections on two occasions. 97 First, this section
will discuss Indiana Family Institute v. City of Carmel, Indiana, which sought
to eliminate local protections and the “fix” to the RFRA.98 Second, this

Id.

This chapter does not: (1) authorize a provider to refuse to offer or
provide services, facilities, use of public accommodations, goods,
employment, or housing to any member or members of the general
public on the basis of race, color, religion, ancestry, age, national origin,
disability, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or United States
military service . . . .

See IND. CODE § 34-13-9. Though there was a later a “fix,” this was a huge basis for
discrimination in Indiana. Id.
94
See IND. CODE § 34-13-9-0.7 (adopting the “fix” that Indiana added to RFRA, which
added minimal protections against discrimination). See also Hammersmith, supra note 61, at
127 Freedom(“Based on previous case law and the theory of state action, the Indiana RFRA is
invalid in that it unconstitutionally involves the state in discrimination against individuals
based on their sexual orientation.”).
95
See IND. CODE § 34-13-9-0.7. See also United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)
(establishing the state action doctrine, which prevents discrimination only by those who are
“state actors”); Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, LGBT Rights and the Mini RFRA: A Return
to Separate But Equal, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 907, 920 (2016) (“In fact, Arkansas's attempt to pass
an expansive religious freedom law followed the mini RFRA saga in Indiana, where, after
public outcry, Governor Mike Pence demanded amendments to the law to appease the
concern that the law would open the door to sex and gender discrimination.”).
96
See, e.g., Verified Compl., Ind. Family Inst., supra note 74 (addressing an Indiana case in
which religious freedom groups are trying to eliminate city and county protections for the
LGBT community).
97
See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-13-9 (describing Indiana’s infamous RFRA). See also IND. CODE
§ 34-13-9-0.7; Verified Compl., Ind. Family Inst., supra note 74 (analyzing an Indiana case that
was allowed to progress in state court that alleged the RFRA “fix” and local protections for
the LGBT community are unconstitutional).
98
See infra Section II.B.2 (describing the actions by religious freedom groups and
individuals that attempt to eliminate or reduce protections for the LGBT community in
Indiana).
93
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section will describe the bill that the Indiana Senate attempted to pass that
would have eliminated local city and county protections in the state. 99
After the Indiana government created the “fix” to the RFRA, several
groups, such as the Indiana Family Institute, Indiana Family Action, and
The American Family Association of Indiana, felt that their religious
freedom was still being substantially burdened. 100 The groups also felt
that local city and county protections throughout the state were
substantially burdening their religious freedom. 101 As a result, these
groups filed a complaint alleging constitutional violations. 102 What came
as a surprise to most was that the judge allowed the complaint to
proceed.103 This means that the case will be heard.104 If these groups
succeed, the “fix” to the RFRA protecting the LGBT community will be
void, and the local city and county protections currently in place
throughout Indiana will be eliminated.105
In addition to their prayer for relief regarding local protections and
the “fix” to the RFRA, the groups have filed a brief in a Colorado case that
was recently heard before the United States Supreme Court. 106 This case
See infra Section II.B.2.
See Indiana Family Institute, Religious Freedom Legal Defense Fund,
https://secure2.convio.net/ifi/site/Donation2;jsessionid=00000000.app222b?df_id=1520&
1520.donation=landing&NONCE_TOKEN=D0A2EA3A271A763FF88ECAA95595012
[https://perma.cc/7ECZ-MSNT] (“On December 10, 2015, The Indiana Family Institute,
Indiana Family Action, and The American Family Association of Indiana filed a lawsuit
challenging the Constitutionality of last spring’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)
‘fix’ as well as the Carmel and Indianapolis-Marion County Nondiscrimination
Ordinances.”). See also Wang, supra note 70 (describing the groups believing their rights were
being violated).
101
See Wang, supra note 70.
102
See Verified Compl., Ind. Family Inst., supra note 74 (highlighting the allegations of
various religious groups that the RFRA fix and local protections for the LGBT community
are unconstitutional because they violate these groups’ religious freedom and liberties).
103
See Wang, supra note 70.
104
See id. (describing the groups who felt their religious rights were being violated by the
RFRA “fix” and the local protections provided to the LGBT community).
105
See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-13-9-0.7 (observing the “fix” that Indiana added to RFRA, which
added minimal protections against discrimination). See also ORD. § 6-8 (underlining the city’s
addition of “sexual identification” and “gender identity or expression” to the classes
protected from discrimination); ORD. § 581 (examining Indianapolis and Marion County’s
addition of “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” as protected classes).
106
See Brief for Indiana Family Institute, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111), 2017
WL 3913765 (analyzing the brief filed by these religious groups in Indiana asking the
Supreme Court to rule broadly enough to dispose of the ongoing Indiana case). See also
Maureen Groppe, How the Gay Wedding Cake Case in Colorado May Affect LGBT Rights in
Indiana, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/
politics/2017/08/31/conservative-foegroups-challenging-rfra-fix-ask-supreme-courtweigh-through-colorado-gay-wedding-cas/621782001/
[https://perma.cc/2EA6-E4DR]
99

100
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will be discussed further in the next subsection.107 The brief filed in the
Supreme Court case asked the Court to rule broad enough to decide the
prayer for relief in Indiana.108
3.

The Colorado Wedding Cake Case

In Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., a same-sex couple in Colorado
asked a baker to create a cake for their wedding. 109 Unlike Indiana,
Colorado’s Civil Rights Act protects individuals from discrimination
based on sexual orientation in access to public accommodations. 110 Also,
Colorado does not have a religious freedom act that allows private
businesses to discriminate if they feel their religious freedom is
substantially burdened.111 Regardless, the Colorado baker refused, stating
that creating this cake for a same-sex wedding would substantially burden
his religious freedom.112 Both the state trial court and the Colorado
Supreme Court decided that this type of discrimination violated
Colorado’s Civil Rights Act.113 As a result, one cannot discriminate based

(explaining the plaintiffs in Indiana Family Institute v. City of Carmel, Indiana filing a brief with
the Supreme Court in Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. asking the Justices to rule broad
enough that it would conclude this case as well).
107
See infra Section II.B.3 (describing the case of Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., which
was recently argued before the United States Supreme Court).
108
See Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 106 (highlighting the brief filed by various
religious groups requesting that the Supreme Court rule broadly in this case).
109
See Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276 (Colo. App. 2015) cert.
granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290
(June 26, 2017) (describing the Colorado Supreme Court case, which sided with the same-sex
couple). The same-sex couple, Craig and Mullins, visited Phillip’s bakery in Lakewood,
Colorado, and requested that he make a wedding cake. Id. at 277.
110
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (establishing that it is unlawful to discriminate based
on sexual orientation if providing a “public accommodation”).
111
See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-13-9-0.7 (exploring the RFRA’s fix, which added language
preventing businesses and organizations from discriminating based on sexual orientation).
112
See Mullins, 370 P.3d at 276 (“Phillips declined, telling them that he does not create
wedding cakes for same-sex weddings because of his religious beliefs, but advising Craig
and Mullins that he would be happy to make and sell them any other baked goods.”). See
also Deborah A. Widiss, Intimate Liberties and Antidiscrimination Law, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 2083,
2087 (2017) (“[B]usinesses have argued that their refusal to provide wedding-related services
to same-sex couples is not a form of unlawful discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, but rather simply disapproval of same-sex marriage.”).
113
See Mullins, 370 P.3d at 277 (observing the decisions of the Colorado state trial court and
Supreme Court in deciding whether Phillips violated the state’s antidiscrimination law).
Craig and Mullins later filed charges of discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights
Division (Division), alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation. Id. The ALJ then
found for the same-sex couple, and the Commission affirmed the decision. Id. Masterpiece
and Phillips then appealed this decision. Id.
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solely on sexual orientation, even as a private business with religious
freedom as a justification. 114
The baker, Masterpiece Cakeshop, requested certiorari, which the
United States Supreme Court granted. 115 Considering the brief filed by
the Plaintiffs in the Indiana case, Indiana Family Institute v. City of Carmel,
Indiana, a lot of rights could have been determined by this landmark
The Department of Justice under President Trump’s
case.116
administration also released an opinion on the matter.117 In this opinion,
the Department of Justice sided with the baker, stating that his religious
freedom should be protected over those of the same-sex couple being
refused service.118 The Supreme Court may have decided this case
without even considering the opinion of the Department of Justice, but it
is currently clear that our nation’s executive branch has decided
discrimination based on sexual orientation is justified. 119
D. Not So Equal Protections
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides in part, “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”120 The Supreme Court has
relied on this clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, known as the Equal
See id. at 277 (“We conclude that the act of same-sex marriage is closely correlated to
Craig's and Mullins' sexual orientation, and therefore, the ALJ did not err when he found
that Masterpiece's refusal to create a wedding cake for Craig and Mullins was “because of”
their sexual orientation, in violation of CADA.”).
115
See Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. granted
sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (June 26,
2017).
116
See Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 106 (evaluating the request by various religious
groups in Indiana to rule broadly enough to dispose of their case). See also Groppe, supra
note 106 (reviewing the request by Plaintiffs in the Indiana case to rule broadly).
117
See Ryan J. Reilly, Trump DOJ To Supreme Court: Making Gay Wedding Cake Would Violate
Baker’s Rights, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/trump-justice-department-gay-wedding-cake_us_59b1af6fe4b0dfaafcf69ee6
[https://perma.cc/K5W9-4ELX] (conveying the content of the brief filed by the Department
of Justice under Trump siding with the baker in Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc.).
118
See id. (“Forcing Phillips to create expression for and participate in a ceremony that
violates his sincerely held religious beliefs invades his First Amendment rights.”). See also
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2017) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4004530
(analyzing the brief filed by the Department of Justice that sided with the baker who refused
service to same-sex couple).
119
See Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. granted
sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (June 26,
2017). See also Reilly, supra note 117 (noting that the Department of Justice supports the baker
who denied service to the same-sex couple on First Amendment grounds).
120
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
114
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Protection Clause, as a key provision for combating invidious
discrimination.121 The Fourteenth Amendment, however, has been
interpreted to apply only to state action and not to private, or non-state,
actors.122
When an equal protection claim is brought against a state actor, a
court will look at a law or policy using one of three types of judicial
scrutiny: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis. 123 Strict
scrutiny is reserved for those groups considered to be “suspect
classifications,” such as race or national origin, and requires a court to look
at whether the law or policy is narrowly tailored and necessary to achieve
a compelling government interest. 124 Intermediate scrutiny does not rise
to the level of strict scrutiny, but instead requires that the law or policy be
substantially related to an important government interest.125 Finally, there
is rational basis review, which only requires a law or policy be rationally
related to a legitimate government interest. 126 Under rational basis

121
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (outlining the Supreme Court’s analysis,
which sparked the modern era of equal protection jurisprudence). Justice Warren writing
for the Court stated:
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of
“separate but equal” has no place. Separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others
similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by
reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 495.
122
See United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (“It is State action of a particular
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter
of the amendment.”). See also Hammersmith, supra note 61, at 124 (“The Constitution,
however, only gives an individual rights against the government and not a private party. In
other words, private conduct need not comply with the Constitution.”).
123
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (setting the standard at “rational basis”
when determining the constitutionality of legislation that discriminates against persons
based on sexual orientation); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297 (2013) (establishing the
application of strict scrutiny based on race); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (applying
intermediate scrutiny for discrimination based on gender).
124
See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 862 (describing the strict scrutiny test that courts
apply and the groups covered by this test). See also Fisher, 570 U.S. at 298–99 (announcing
the application of strict scrutiny based on racial discrimination).
125
See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 861 (outlining the intermediate scrutiny test
that courts apply and the groups covered by this test). See also Craig, 429 U.S. at 197–98
(establishing the application of intermediate scrutiny based on gender).
126
See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 858 (detailing the rational basis test that courts
apply and the groups covered by the test). See also Romer, 517 U.S. at 627–36 (setting the
standard at “rational basis” when determining the constitutionality of legislation that
discriminates against persons based on sexual orientation).
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review, the burden of proof is on the party challenging a law or policy,
and the government or state actor will usually win.127
As in Romer v. Evans, when a state actor discriminates based on sexual
orientation or gender identity, a court will analyze using rational basis
review.128 In Windsor, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of the
DOMA after an equal protection claim was brought by a widowed lesbian
in New York.129 The Court again discussed the standard that the court
should apply when looking at equal protection based on sexual
orientation, and it again seemed to apply rational basis, though this now
appears to be rational basis with a bite.130
While the Supreme Court has yet to decide otherwise, the Ninth
Circuit seems to have begun the trend towards heightened scrutiny. 131 In
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., the court finally mentioned
heightened scrutiny based on sexual orientation.132 While it is true that
127
See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961) (explaining the deference given
to state actors and legislators in passing laws, even if those laws create some discrimination,
when courts use rational basis review). See also Robert C. Farrell, The Two Versions of RationalBasis Review and Same-Sex Relationships, 86 WASH. L. REV. 281, 324 (2011) (noting the
challenger's burden is to “negative every conceivable basis which might support [the
statute], whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record”).
128
See Romer, 517 U.S. 627–36 (observing the court’s analysis in whether or not to invalidate
the discriminatory law, which involved looking at whether the law was rationally related to
a legitimate government interest).
129
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (“In granting certiorari on the
question of the constitutionality of § 3 of DOMA, the Court requested argument on two
additional questions: whether the United States’ agreement with Windsor’s legal position
precludes further review and whether BLAG has standing to appeal the case.”). In this case,
Justice Kennedy, speaking for the majority, states:
The Constitution’s guarantee of equality “must at the very least mean
that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot” justify disparate treatment of that group. In determining
whether a law is motived by an improper animus or purpose,
“‘[d]iscriminations of an unusual character’” especially require careful
consideration. DOMA cannot survive under these principles.
Id. at 2693 (citations omitted).
130
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (“The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here
in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who
enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”).
131
See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 481 (9th Cir. 2014) (“In its
words and its deed, Windsor established a level of scrutiny for classifications based on sexual
orientation that is unquestionably higher than rational basis review.”).
132
See id. (holding that discrimination based on sexual orientation during jury selection
violated equal protection because the court should apply a heightened standard). The Ninth
Circuit in this case looks to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Windsor to determine the level
of scrutiny to be applied. Id. The court came to the conclusion that “Windsor's ‘careful
consideration’ of DOMA's actual purpose and its failure to consider other unsupported bases
is antithetical to the very concept of rational basis review.” Id. at 482. The court decided that
a heightened level of scrutiny is required based on the reasoning from Windsor. Id. at 484.
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the Court in Windsor hinted at it, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
SmithKline expressly stated that “[they were] required by Windsor to apply
heightened scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orientation for
purposes of equal protection.”133 Regardless, when a Plaintiff brings an
equal protection claim based on sexual orientation discrimination, the
Supreme Court will analyze using rational basis review.134
III. ANALYSIS
Indiana, as well as its citizens, would benefit from comprehensive,
state-wide protections for the LGBT community. 135 As described in Part
II.B of this Note, the LGBT citizens of Indiana are currently only protected
by a patchwork of protections.136 In order to protect the LGBT community
from further discrimination, Indiana should amend its Civil Rights Act
and add the terms “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” to the list of
protected groups.137 Without these protections, LGBT citizens are left only
with the option of an equal protection claim if the discrimination is by a
state actor and no legal options if the discrimination is by a private
party.138
First, Part III.A emphasizes the important issues the LGBT community
faces in Indiana and the need for increased protections.139 Second, Part
III.B describes the possible equal protection claims the LGBT community
could bring when a state actor discriminates against members of the LGBT
community.140 Third, Part III.C analyzes Colorado’s solution to private
party discrimination, such as amending its Civil Rights Act to provide

133
Compare United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (noting that courts must give
careful consideration), with SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 484 (9th
Cir. 2014) (creating rational basis with a bite).
134
See Parker Williams, Scrutiny of the Venire, Scrutiny from the Bench: Smithkline Beecham
Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories and the Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Sexual Orientation
Classifications, 64 CATH. U. L. REV. 803, 803, 817 (2015) (“[In Romer, t]he Supreme Court struck
down the law under rational basis review, finding that it ‘fail[ed], indeed defie[d], even [the
rational basis] conventional inquiry.’”).
135
See infra Part II.D (discussing how providing protections to the LGBT community would
benefit the state of Indiana as a whole).
136
See supra Part II.A (conveying the current protections, both federal and state, that LGBT
citizens have preventing discrimination).
137
See infra Part IV (proposing a simple solution of amending Indiana’s Civil Rights Act,
which would provide LGBT citizens with increased protections from discrimination).
138
See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974).
139
See infra Part III.A (describing the various reasons both LGBT citizens and non-LGBT
citizens in Indiana need comprehensive protections for LGBT citizens).
140
See infra Part III.B (analyzing the realities of an equal protections claim as an option for
LGBT citizens in Indiana when they are discriminated against).
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LGBT citizens a private cause of action.141 Finally, Part III.D discusses the
realities of amending Indiana’s Civil Rights Act to include protections for
LGBT citizens.142
A. The Need for Comprehensive Protections
Through legislation, many states provide protections to LGBT citizens
based on sexual orientation and gender identity. 143 These states
demonstrate that discrimination based on these characteristics, whether
by the state or by private parties, will no longer be tolerated.144 States such
as Indiana that have failed to add these types of protections harm not only
their LGBT citizens by leaving them vulnerable to blatant discrimination
based on nothing but ideology but also harm the economic well-being of
the state.145
In terms of vulnerability to discrimination, currently, Indiana Code
§ 31-11-1-1 invalidates any marriage between members of the same
gender in the state, even if these marriages are legally valid in the state
where they were solemnized.146 While it is true that this statute cannot be
upheld due to Obergefell,147 protections for LGBT citizens in Indiana are
See infra Part III.C (detailing the advantages of antidiscrimination legislation for LGBT
citizens, especially the steps that Colorado took to protect its citizens).
142
See infra Part III.D (observing that amending Indiana’s Civil Rights Act seems extreme,
however it is actually not that unlikely based on the state’s history).
143
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 49.60.030 (noting “[t]he right to be free from
discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, honorably discharged
veteran or military status, sexual orientation”); N.Y. EXEC. LAW 296 (“For an employer or
licensing agency, because of an individual’s age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual
orientation . . . .”); WIS. STAT. ANN. 111.36 (defining employment discrimination as
“[d]iscriminating against any individual in promotion, compensation paid for equal or
substantially similar work, or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment or licensing
on the basis of sex . . .”). See also State Maps of Laws & Policies: Public Accommodations, HUM.
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Apr. 25, 2015), https://www.hrc.org/state-maps/public-accomodations
[https://perma.cc/A4PD-FHDG] (portraying a map of various states that provide
protections for LGBT citizens from discrimination in public accommodations).
144
See Muehlmeyer, supra note 31, at 782–83 (discussing various state’s protections for
LGBT citizens from discrimination in public accommodations and the impact these changes
have had on those states); David M. Forman, A Room for “Adam and Steve” at Mrs. Murphy's
Bed and Breakfast: Avoiding the Sin of Inhospitality in Places of Public Accommodation, 23 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 326, 365 n.174 (2012) (conveying various businesses’ refusals to accommodate
gay and lesbian couples at bed and breakfast establishments for religious reasons).
145
See Lauren Box, Note, It’s Not Personal, It’s Just Business: The Economic Impact of LGBT
Legislation, 48 IND. L. REV. 995, 997 (2015) (“This Note explores the impact of LGBT legislation
on a state's economy, arguing that a refusal to pass positive LGBT legislation can have a
negative economic impact on a state's coffers and its ability to attract economic investment.”).
146
See IND. CODE § 31-11-1-1 (stating that “a marriage between persons of the same gender
is void in Indiana even if the marriage is lawful in the place where it is solemnized”).
147
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015) (“The Court, in this decision, holds
same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States.”).
141
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only provided by the patchwork described in Part II.A of this Note. 148
While it is also true that this patchwork provides limited protections in
the form of court cases and local ordinances, many issues may still arise
as a result of lacking state-wide protection.149 For example, LGBT citizens
may be denied access to public accommodations, such as when Memories
Pizza refused to cater a same-sex couple’s wedding because of religious
beliefs.150 Many of these issues are the result of the religious liberties
movement and a difference in moral ideology. 151 Discrimination against
LGBT citizens is a real and ongoing problem in Indiana; therefore,
providing protections against discrimination is imperative. 152
A lack of tolerance for the LGBT community has also been shown to
impact state economics.153 Eliminating protections and allowing for
discrimination negatively impacts a state’s economy. 154 The outcries from
148
See infra Part II.A (describing current protections, both federal and state, that LGBT
citizens have preventing discrimination).
149
See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (prohibiting
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation). The court decided discrimination
based on sexual orientation was forbidden because it fell under “sex” as a protected group.
Id. See also ORD. § 581-101 (2016) (observing Marion County’s protections for the LGBT
community that are beyond those provided by the State); Mariga v. Flint, 822 N.E.2d 620
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (allowing visitation rights to a child born to same-sex parents).
150
See Coyne, supra note 82 (“A northern Indiana pizzeria that closed after its owner said
his religious beliefs wouldn’t allow him to cater a gay wedding opened Thursday to a full
house of friends, regulars and people wanting to show their support.”).
151
See Nancy J. Knauer, Religious Exemptions, Marriage Equality, and the Establishment of
Religion, 84 UMKC L. REV. 749, 782 (2016) (exploring the impact freedom of religious
expression has on the rights of LGBT citizens). In her article, Knauer states the following
with regard to attitudes about LGBT citizens:
There is no question that religious beliefs that teach disapproval and
even animus towards LGBT individuals and their families enjoy
absolute protection under the Free Exercise Clause. However, when
religious beliefs translate into public action they traditionally step over
the line and become subject to state regulation. For example, a county
clerk who refuses to issue a marriage license to a same-sex couple could
face internal discipline or criminal charges for the failure to discharge
her official duties or a federal lawsuit for deprivation of civil rights.
Religious marriage exemption laws would protect the clerk from such
actions provided the refusal was based on his religious belief that
marriage is between one man and one woman.
Id. at 782.
152
See LGBT Rights in Indiana, EQUALDEX (2018), https://www.equaldex.com/region/
united-states/indiana [https://perma.cc/2VH2-WMRY] (outlining the areas in which LGBT
citizens in Indiana still lack protection, including in employment discrimination, housing
discrimination, and public accommodations).
153
See Box, supra note 145, at 1013–20 (conveying the various economic impacts that
discrimination has on a state).
154
See, e.g., Alesia, supra note 89 (“NCAA President Mark Emmert expressed concern
Thursday about Indiana's ‘religious freedom’ law, saying the Indianapolis-based group
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Indiana-based corporations after Governor Pence signed the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act into effect demonstrate some of these negative
implications.155 After this Act was signed, many large corporations and
organizations in Indiana threatened to leave the state if this blatant
discrimination was allowed based on religious justifications. 156 These
corporations and organizations include those whose headquarters are
located in Indiana, such as the NCAA, Angie’s List, and Subaru. 157
Texas also experienced similar corporate outcries after attempting
passage of its bathroom ban bill. 158 According to a Dallas News article,
“CEOs from 51 Fortune 500 companies have publicly condemned the
bathroom bill as discriminatory and bad for the Texas economy. Three of
those firms are in the top 10, and 20 are headquartered in Texas.” 159 These
examples demonstrate that various corporations actively opposed the
elimination of LGBT protections. 160 This shows that failure to provide
protections may lead to adverse economic effects on Indiana as a whole.161
B. Is All Discrimination Equal?
The Fourteenth Amendment provides LGBT citizens with equal
protection under the law.162 As a result, LGBT citizens may use the
would examine ‘how it might affect future events as well as our workforce.’”). See also Box,
supra note 145, at 998 (“Consequently, states lacking inclusive LGBT policies will miss out on
valuable investment.”). “For example, executives of large Fortune-500 companies like
Facebook have expressed hesitancy toward investing in states lacking pro-LGBT legislation.”
Id.
155
See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-13-9 (portraying Indiana’s infamous RFRA, which allowed
religious groups to assert that their religious beliefs would be substantially burdened by
something as a defense).
156
See Rosenbaum, supra note 86 (discussing the various corporations who threatened to
leave Indiana as a result of RFRA). Large corporations who joined in the discussion include
Yelp, PayPal, and the NCAA. Id. There is also a discussion about the amount of talent that
would likely leave the state as a result of the discriminatory act. Id.
157
See Steiger, supra note 88 (observing various corporations and organizations such as
NCAA, Angie’s List, and Subaru, who threatened action based on RFRA passage).
158
See S.B. 6, 85th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2017) (relating to regulations and policies for
entering or using a bathroom or changing facility; authorizing a civil penalty).
159
Lauren McGaughy & Ariana Giorgi, Big Business Has (Almost) Killed the Texas Bathroom
Bill, DALLAS NEWS (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/texaslegislature/2017/08/09/big-business-almost-killedthe-texas-bathroom-bill
[https://perma.cc/5DY7-JWFU].
160
See Steiger, supra note 88 (observing various corporations and organizations who
threatened to leave Indiana as a result of the discriminatory act).
161
See Box, supra note 145, at 998 (discussing the various economic impacts that
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity has on a state).
162
See U.S CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). See also Stephen Michael Sheppard, Bouvier
Law Dictionary Equal Protection Clause, THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY
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Fourteenth Amendment as a cause of action when they are discriminated
against based on sexual orientation or gender identity. 163 The issue,
however, is that the Fourteenth Amendment only prevents state actors
from discriminating.164 Therefore, an LGBT citizen may only sue state
actors under the Fourteenth Amendment and may not assert an equal
protection claim against a private party.165 In addition, equal protection
claims based on sexual orientation or gender identity against state actors
are very difficult to win, especially in light of religious freedom
protections.166 Section III.B.1 acknowledges the inadequacies of an equal
protection claim when an LGBT citizen is discriminated against. 167 Section
III.B.2 addresses the difficult burden an LGBT citizen bringing an equal
protection claim would have to meet.168
1.

The Realities of an Equal Protection Claim

Even when it is a state actor discriminating, an equal protection claim
is nearly impossible to win due to the rational basis review a court would
apply.169 Of the three types of scrutiny discussed in Part II.C, laws
affecting LGBT citizens in Indiana would likely not be entitled to strict or

(2012) (“The guarantee of equal protection of the laws requires the assessment of all
categories created by laws that assign a burden or a benefit to one group but not to another.”).
163
See John Nicodemo, Comment, Homosexuals, Equal Protection, and the Guarantee of
Fundamental Rights in the New Decade: An Optimist's Quasi-Suspect View of Recent Events and
Their Impact on Heightened Scrutiny for Sexual Orientation-Based Discrimination, 28 TOURO L.
REV. 285, 289 (2012) (“Fourteenth Amendment scholars and enthusiasts have witnessed a
series of events in the years 2010 and 2011 that somehow indicate a potential for a change in
the status of the LGBT community in Equal Protection issues.”).
164
See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972) (“Our cases make clear that
the impetus for the forbidden discrimination need not originate with the State if it is state
action that enforces privately originated discrimination.”).
165
See id. at 173 (“Our holdings indicate that where the impetus for the discrimination is
private, the State must have ‘significantly involved itself with invidious discriminations’ in
order for the discriminatory action to fall within the ambit of the constitutional
prohibition.”).
166
See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (“The burden is to ‘negative every conceivable
basis which might support it, whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record.’”).
167
See infra Section III.B.1 (outlining the realities of an equal protection claim for an LGBT
citizen who has been discriminated against).
168
See infra Section III.B.2 (analyzing the difficult burden that an LGBT citizen will have to
meet, especially in light of the heightened level of scrutiny based on religious liberties).
169
See Farrell, supra note 127, at 324 (describing the heavy burden that must be met by a
plaintiff under rational basis review). See also Rational Basis Scrutiny Law and Legal Definition,
(2016),
https://definitions.uslegal.com/r/rational-basis-scrutiny/
USLEGAL.COM
[https://perma.cc/XGL3-QARL] (“Under rational basis scrutiny, the means need only be
‘rationally related’ to a conceivable and legitimate state end.”).
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intermediate scrutiny.170 In fact, it appears that a court would actually
look at these laws under a rational basis review. 171 In Romer v. Evans, the
Supreme Court set the standard at “rational basis” when determining the
constitutionality of legislation that discriminates against persons based on
sexual orientation.172 However, the Supreme Court as of late seemed to
almost waiver in its conviction to applying a rational basis standard. 173
There is of course an argument that the Court actually applies a higher
standard based on sexual orientation. 174 There is also an argument that
courts should apply an even higher level of scrutiny based on sexual
orientation being an immutable trait.175 This, however, is a topic for
another scholarly work that the author will likely pursue in the future. 176
Regardless, as of now, a court will likely only use some variation of
rational basis review when an equal protection claim is brought against a
state actor who is discriminating based on sexual orientation or gender
170
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (conveying the standard at “rational basis”
when determining the constitutionality of legislation that discriminates against persons
based on sexual orientation). See also SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d
471, 489 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that discrimination based on sexual orientation during jury
selection violated equal protection, however the court here appears to use a more stringent
test than simply rational basis).
171
See Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 950–51 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that
the Seventh Circuit applies rational basis review in cases of discrimination based on sexual
orientation).
“Homosexuals do not enjoy any heightened protection under the
Constitution.” Id. at 951.
172
See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629. See also Katie R. Eyer, Protected Class Rational Basis Review,
95 N.C. L. REV. 975, 992–93 (“Thus, while discussions of ‘animus’ and a special ‘rational basis
with bite’ standard have dominated scholarly descriptions of the LGBT rights cases'
connection with rational basis review, in fact the cases themselves—and the lower courts'
application of them—have, as in the 1970s, applied a variety of diverse, often diffuse and
poorly defined approaches to robust rational basis scrutiny.”).
173
Compare United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (finding the DOMA to be
unconstitutional), with SmithKline Beecham Corp., 740 F.3d at 471 (ruling that discrimination
based on sexual orientation during jury selection violated equal protection).
174
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (highlighting the holding of this monumental case that
declared the DOMA unconstitutional and arguably applied a heightened standard). The
court does not seem to conclude exactly what level of scrutiny should be applied. Id. See also
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 740 F.3d at 481. The Ninth Circuit in this case looks to the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Windsor to determine the level of scrutiny to be applied. Id. The court
came to the conclusion that “Windsor's ‘careful consideration’ of DOMA's actual purpose and
its failure to consider other unsupported bases is antithetical to the very concept of rational
basis review.” Id. at 482. The court decided that a heightened level of scrutiny was required
based on the reasoning in Windsor. Id. at 484.
175
See, e.g., Samuel A. Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 646 (2001)
(discussing the new concepts of which traits are considered immutable by the courts and
traits that are not). Marcosson makes a strong argument that sexual orientation is
constructively immutable, meaning that the characteristic of sexual orientation should be
treated as immutable by the law. Id. at 691.
176
The author reserves this topic for further discussion and analysis.
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identity.177 This leaves a plaintiff bringing an equal protection claim with
a very heavy burden, and the plaintiff is therefore likely to lose on this
claim.178
2.

An Equal Protection Claim Is Insufficient

While the Supreme Court seems to have opted for the rational basis
test in regard to sexual orientation, the Court has opted for a heightened
level of scrutiny when looking at religious liberties. 179 In Employment
Division v. Smith, Justice Scalia delivered the majority opinion for the
Supreme Court, analyzing how religious liberties apply to certain laws.180
Most significant, however, is Justice O’Connor’s discussion in her
concurrence about the level of scrutiny to apply when looking at First
Amendment protection.181 These rights will be encroached upon only if
they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. 182
The Supreme Court again used strict scrutiny in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.183
In this case, the Supreme Court held that the Affordable Care Act’s
contraceptive mandate violated equal protection because it substantially
burdened Hobby Lobby’s religious exercise. 184

177
See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 759–60 (2011)
(describing the tendency of the canon to focus on specific theories of “rational basis with
bite” and “animus” as the exclusive explanations for meaningful rational basis review,
including the LGBT rights cases).
178
See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (“[O]ur decisions presume the
constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classification
challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”).
179
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (discussing the heightened
level of scrutiny courts apply when looking at religious expression).
180
See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
181
See id. at 894 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Under our established First Amendment
jurisprudence, we have recognized that the freedom to act, unlike the freedom to believe,
cannot be absolute.”). See also Michael D. Currie, Scrutiny Mutiny: Why the Iowa Supreme
Court Should Reject Employment Division v. Smith and Adopt a Strict Scrutiny Standard for
Free-Exercise Claims Arising Under the Iowa Constitution, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1363, 1378 (“Every
state supreme court that has rejected Smith's rational-basis test in favor of adopting a
heightened or strict scrutiny standard of review has compared the text of its state
constitution's free-exercise provision to the Free Exercise Clause.”).
182
See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (describing the
level of scrutiny applied by the court regarding freedom of speech as strict scrutiny). Justice
O’Connor noted, “The compelling interest test effectuates the First Amendment's command
that religious liberty is an independent liberty, that it occupies a preferred position, and that
the Court will not permit encroachments upon this liberty, whether direct or indirect, unless
required by clear and compelling governmental interests ‘of the highest order.’” Id. at 895.
183
See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 688–92 (discussing the heightened level of scrutiny courts
apply when looking at religious expression).
184
See id. As discussed by Justice Alito in the majority opinion:
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Due to varying levels of scrutiny, if it came down to a conflict between
protections of religious liberties and protections based on sexual
orientation or gender identity, religious liberties would likely win. 185 This
would mean continued discrimination against the LGBT community
based on “religious liberties,” and also the possibility of increased
discrimination.186 This is a legitimate concern that citizens of Indiana must
address in light of both recent legislation and lawsuits that are attempting
to limit, or even eliminate, protections against blatant discrimination
based on sexual orientation or gender identity.187
As a result, a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim is
therefore insufficient to protect LGBT citizens in Indiana against
discrimination.188 First, equal protection claims, even if successful, only
protect LGBT citizens in Indiana from discrimination by state actors. 189
Second, even when these claims can be brought by LGBT citizens, they are

The “exercise of religion” involves “not only belief and profession but
the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts” that are “engaged
in for religious reasons.” Business practices that are compelled or
limited by the tenets of a religious doctrine fall comfortably within that
definition. Thus, a law that “operates so as to make the practice
of . . . religious beliefs more expensive” in the context of business
activities imposes a burden on the exercise of religion.
Id. at 2770.
185
Compare Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (setting the standard at “rational basis”
when determining the constitutionality of legislation that discriminates against persons
based on sexual orientation), with Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 688–92
(2014) (discussing the heightened level of scrutiny applied by courts when analyzing
religious expression).
186
See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Peacemaking in the Culture War Between Gay Rights and
Religious Liberty, 95 IOWA L. REV. 747, 780 (2010) (conveying the proposed form of mediation
that in order to help proponents of LGBT rights and proponents of religious liberties
reconcile their differences). “A significant subset of objectors to LGBT rights feels an
emerging threat to religious liberty; they fear that a law or policy ensuring LGBT equality
will require them to do something inconsistent with their religious beliefs or prevent them
from doing something that their religious beliefs require.” Id. at 750.
187
See, e.g., Verified Compl., Ind. Family Inst., supra note 74 (introducing a current lawsuit
in Indiana, in which members of religious liberties groups are attempting to eliminate city
and county protections for LGBT citizens); S.B. 100, 119th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind.
2016) (describing the attempt by Indiana legislators to pass a bill that would eliminate all
increased city and county protections for LGBT citizens).
188
See Farrell, supra note 127, at 318.
189
See Kevin Cole, Federal And State “State Action”: The Undercritical Embrace of a
Hypercriticized Doctrine, 24 GA. L. REV. 327, 329 (1990) (describing the state action doctrine as
applied in both state and federal courts and as applied under both the U.S. Constitution and
state constitutions). See also United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (holding that the
constitution applies only to “state actors,” and not to individuals).
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nearly impossible to win because a court will only analyze using rational
basis review.190
C. But Private Actors Can Still Discriminate?
Even if by chance an LGBT citizen were able to win an equal
protection claim against a state actor based on discrimination, an LGBT
citizen could not bring such a claim against private parties who
discriminate.191 Because the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to
private parties, individual states must provide protections in the form of
Civil Rights Acts in order to protect citizens, such as LGBT citizens, from
private party discrimination.192
One such state that provides protections from discrimination for its
LGBT citizens is Colorado.193 Colorado’s Civil Rights Act gives LGBT
citizens a cause of action when they are discriminated against. 194 These
protections allow LGBT citizens to sue if denied access to a public
convenience or accommodation based on their sexual orientation or
gender identity.195 More importantly, these protections would allow for a
cause of action against anyone who discriminates, whether it is a state
actor or a private citizen.196 The protections therefore provide the LGBT
citizen who has been discriminated against a cause of action against a
190
See also Rational Basis Scrutiny Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM (2016),
https://definitions.uslegal.com/r/rational-basis-scrutiny/
[https://perma.cc/XGL3QARL].
191
See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349–50 (1974) (“While the principle that
private action is immune from the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment is well
established and easily stated, the question whether particular conduct is ‘private,’ on the one
hand, or ‘state action,’ on the other, frequently admits of no easy answer.”).
192
See Muehlmeyer, supra note 31, at 786 (“Absent a contravening statute, the common law
general rule is that the owner or the agent of a public accommodation may refuse admission
or service to anyone for any reason.”).
193
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (“It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a
person, directly or indirectly, to refuse . . . because of disability, race, creed, color, sex, sexual
orientation, marital status, national origin, or ancestry, the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods . . . or accommodations of a place of public accommodation.”).
194
See Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 280 (Colo. App. 2015) (“[T]o
prevail on a discrimination claim under CADA, plaintiffs must prove that, ‘but for’ their
membership in an enumerated class, they would not have been denied the full privileges of
a place of public accommodation.”).
195
See id. at 279 (“We conclude that the act of same-sex marriage is closely correlated to
Craig's and Mullins' sexual orientation, and therefore, the ALJ did not err when he found
that Masterpiece's refusal to create a wedding cake for Craig and Mullins was ‘because of’
their sexual orientation, in violation of CADA.”).
196
See id. at 280 (“[A] ‘place of public accommodation’ is ‘any place of business engaged in
any sales to the public and any place offering services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations to the public, including but not limited to any business offering wholesale
or retail sales to the public.’”).
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private party, such as a pizza restaurant, but also allows the citizen to
avoid bringing a burdensome equal protection claim.197
Unlike Colorado, the Indiana Civil Rights Act does not include
“sexual orientation” or “gender identity” as protected groups, and
therefore does not provide “access to public conveniences and
accommodations” based on these characteristics.198 As a result, in Indiana,
a same-sex couple denied services from a “public accommodation” would
have no source of relief under the Indiana Civil Rights Act. 199 This means
that had it not been for the backlash from businesses to the RFRA that
eventually resulted in a “fix,” an Indiana pizza restaurant could have
continued discriminating without any repercussions under the Indiana
Civil Rights Act.200
One example of Colorado’s success is the case of Masterpiece v. Mullins,
which allowed the plaintiffs to bring their discrimination claim using
Colorado’s antidiscrimination law as a legal platform. 201 In Indiana, the
plaintiffs would have been unable to bring an equal protection claim
because Masterpiece Cakeshop would likely not be considered a “state
actor.”202 Even if they were able to somehow argue Masterpiece Cakeshop
was a “state actor,” the plaintiffs would still be required to meet the heavy
burden associated with rational basis review, which is the level of scrutiny
a court would apply based on sexual orientation discrimination. 203 The
197
See id. at 283 (“CADA prohibits places of public accommodations from basing their
refusal to serve customers on their sexual orientation, and Masterpiece violated Colorado's
public accommodations law by refusing to create a wedding cake for Craig's and Mullins'
same-sex wedding celebration.”).
198
See IND. CODE § 22-9-1-3(m) (defining “public accommodations”).
199
Compare IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2 (analyzing Indiana’s Civil Rights Act, which does not
provide protections based on sexual orientation and gender identity), with COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 24-34-601 (portraying Colorado’s antidiscrimination law which prevents discrimination in
public accommodations based on sexual orientation or gender identity). See, e.g., Mullins v.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 283 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. granted sub nom.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (June 26, 2017)
(“CADA prohibits places of public accommodations from basing their refusal to serve
customers on their sexual orientation, and Masterpiece violated Colorado's public
accommodations law by refusing to create a wedding cake for Craig's and Mullins' same-sex
wedding celebration.”).
200
See Kim, supra note 60 (portraying a pizza restaurant in Walkerton, Indiana, that refused
to cater a same-sex wedding, citing to RFRA as a protection).
201
See Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 283 (Colo. App. 2015).
202
See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 354 (1974) (“Doctors, optometrists,
lawyers, Metropolitan, and Nebbia's upstate New York grocery selling a quart of milk are all
in regulated businesses, providing arguably essential goods and services, ‘affected with a
public interest.’ We do not believe that such a status converts their every action, absent more,
into that of the State.”) Id.
203
See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 177, at 759–60 (describing the tendency of the canon to
focus on specific theories of “rational basis with bite” and “animus” as the exclusive
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plaintiffs were able to avoid these considerations because Colorado
provided them a cause of action when discriminated against based on
sexual orientation.204 Therefore, amending the Indiana Civil Rights Act
would give LGBT citizens in Indiana a cause of action against private
actors when they are discriminated against and would also allow these
citizens to avoid bringing a burdensome equal protection claim. 205
D. Amending Indiana Code Section 31-11-1-1 Is Not So Far-Fetched After All
While there are legitimate concerns regarding the possibilities of
blatant discrimination, this section addresses concerns that amending the
Indiana Civil Rights Act to provide protections for the LGBT community
is unrealistic.206 It is inevitable that opposition to amending the Indiana
Civil Rights Act will include religious liberties movement arguments, but
opponents may also argue this solution is too far-fetched for a
conservative state like Indiana.207
While it is true that Colorado is considered more progressive than
Indiana in regard to LGBT rights, amending the Civil Rights Act in
Indiana is still realistic.208 First, Indiana demonstrated its favor towards
the religious liberties movement when it passed RFRA in 2014.209 As a
result of this Act, Memories Pizza restaurant in Walkerton, Indiana, was
allowed to refuse catering services to a same-sex couple because the
restaurant owner claimed his religious liberties allowed him to refuse this

explanations for meaningful rational basis review, including the LGBT rights cases). See, e.g.,
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (deferring to the state when applying rational
basis review).
204
See Mullins, 370 P.3d at 293 (“Without CADA, businesses could discriminate against
potential patrons based on their sexual orientation. Such discrimination in places of public
accommodation has measurable adverse economic effects.”) Id.
205
See, e.g., Muehlmeyer, supra note 31, at 786 (describing that without some form of statute
or legislation making discrimination unlawful, the common law generally allows private
parties to discriminate freely in providing goods or services).
206
See, e.g., Box, supra note 145, at 998 (discussing the various economic impacts that
discrimination has on a state).
207
See Lisa Bornstein & Megan Bench, 2015 Special Issue Advancing LGBTQIA Rights in a
Post-Obergefell World: Married on Sunday, Fired on Monday: Approaches to Federal LGBT Civil
Rights Protections, 22 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 31, 51 (“While civil rights protections for
sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination are increasingly recognized, these
protections remain incomplete.”).
208
See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-13-9-0.7 (observing the “fix” that Indiana added to RFRA, which
added minimal protections against discrimination). This is one area at issue in the lawsuit
mentioned above. Id. See also Mariga v. Flint, 822 N.E.2d 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining
the case allowing visitation rights to a child born to same-sex parents).
209
See IND. CODE § 34-13-9.
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service.210 Based on public policy considerations similar to those listed in
Section II.D.1 of this Note, Governor Pence amended RFRA and
incorporated language prohibiting this type of discrimination based on
sexual orientation,211 which was considered a “fix” to the Act.212
Second, Indiana was surprisingly progressive regarding LGBT rights
prior to most regarding visitation rights for adoptive parents of the same
sex.213 In the early 2000s, prior to the landmark case of Obergefell, one
woman in a same-sex relationship adopted the other woman’s biological
child because the women were unable to legally marry in Indiana at the
time.214 The relationship ended up failing, resulting in the biological
mother moving to another state with the child. 215 After being denied
visitation rights to the adopted child, the Indiana Court of Appeals ended
up granting the adoptive mother visitation rights.216
As a result, both the executive and judicial branches of government in
Indiana acknowledge that the LGBT citizens in Indiana need protection
from discrimination perpetrated by both state actors and private parties. 217
Therefore, legislators should amend the Indiana Civil Rights Act to
provide LGBT citizens with protections from discrimination by both state
and private actors.
IV. CONTRIBUTION
This Note proposes that Indiana amend the Civil Rights Act and add
“sexual orientation” and “gender identity” to the list of protected

See Kim, supra note 60 (portraying the news story where a pizza restaurant refused to
cater a same-sex couple’s wedding, citing to RFRA for protection).
211
See IND. CODE § 34-13-9 (describing Indiana’s infamous RFRA, and although there was
a later a “fix,” this was a huge basis for discrimination in Indiana).
212
See IND. CODE § 34-13-9-0.7.
213
See Mariga, 822 N.E.2d at 624 (“Julie and Lori decided that Julie should adopt the
children for a variety of reasons, among them Julie's desire to provide financially for the
children via life insurance, college assistance, and health insurance, and a hope to solidify
their family unit.”).
214
See id. (“The Tippecanoe County Circuit Court granted her petition for adoption on July
10, 1997, and the children's last names were officially changed to ‘Mariga-Morris.’”).
215
See id. (“In November 1998, Lori and Julie separated, and since that time both children
have remained with Lori.”).
216
See id. at 633 (“As to Julie's petition to vacate the adoption of her children, we find that
the Circuit Court had authority to grant her petition for adoption in 1997, and it was not
procured by fraud.”).
217
See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-13-9-0.7 (“This chapter does not . . . authorize a provider to
refuse to offer or provide services . . . to any member or members of the general public on
the basis of . . . sexual orientation, gender identity . . . .”); Mariga v. Flint, 822 N.E.2d 620, 624
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“In light of the purpose and spirit of Indiana's adoption laws . . . the
legislature could not have intended such a destructive and absurd result.”).
210
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groups.218 First, Part IV.A amends the current Civil Rights Act to reflect
protections based on sexual orientation and gender identity. 219 Next, Part
IV.B explains that amending the language of the current Civil Rights Act
is the best solution to remedy LGBT discrimination in Indiana because it
is realistic and adds the necessary protections. 220
A. The Indiana Civil Rights Act
The Civil Rights Act currently protects citizens against discrimination
“based solely on race, religion, color, sex, disability, national origin, or
ancestry . . . .”221 This Note proposes that Indiana amend the Civil Rights
Act to include “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” to the list of
protected groups.222 This would provide the LGBT community with all
the protections that other groups are currently provided.223 The language
would be as follows:
(a) It is the public policy of the state to provide all of its
citizens equal opportunity for education, employment,
access to public conveniences and accommodations, and
acquisition through purchase or rental of real property,
including but not limited to housing, and to eliminate
segregation or separation based solely on race, religion,
color, sex, disability, national origin, ancestry, sexual
orientation, or gender identity since such segregation is an
impediment to equal opportunity. Equal education and
employment opportunities and equal access to and use of
public accommodations and equal opportunity for
acquisition of real property are hereby declared to be civil
rights.

See IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2 (listing the groups protected by the Indiana Civil Rights Act).
See infra Part IV.B (conveying the changes that would be made to the current Indiana
Civil Rights Act in order to provide protections for the LGBT community).
220
See infra Part IV.B (describing why the addition of “sexual orientation” and “gender
identity” to the Indiana Civil Rights Act is the best solution).
221
IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2.
222
See IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2 (highlighting the lack of protections for citizens based on
“sexual orientation” and “gender identity”). The proposed amendments are italicized and
are the contribution of the author.
223
See IND. CODE § 22-9-1-3 (conveying the definition of “public accommodations”).
Protections are provided to protected groups, including “access to public conveniences and
accommodations.” Id. See also IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2 (demonstrating that Indiana’s Civil
Rights Act currently only protects groups based on race, religion, color, sex, disability,
national orientation, or ancestry).
218
219
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(b) The practice of denying these rights to properly
qualified persons by reason of the race, religion, color,
sex, disability, national origin, ancestry, sexual orientation,
or gender identity of such person is contrary to the
principles of freedom and equality of opportunity and is
a burden to the objectives of the public policy of this state
and shall be considered as discriminatory practices. The
promotion of equal opportunity without regard to race,
religion, color, sex, disability, national origin, ancestry,
sexual orientation, or gender identity through reasonable
methods is the purpose of this chapter.
....
(d) It is hereby declared to be contrary to the public policy
of the state and an unlawful practice for any person, for
profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or
rent any dwelling by representations regarding the entry
or prospective entry into the neighborhood of a person or
persons of a particular race, religion, color, sex, disability,
national origin, ancestry, sexual orientation, or gender
identity.224
B. Commentary
In order to remedy LGBT discrimination in Indiana, this Note
recommends an amendment to the Indiana Civil Rights Act including
“sexual orientation” and “gender identity” to the list of protected
groups.225 First, this amendment is important because the court applies a
higher standard for freedom of speech and expression than it does for
discrimination based on sexual orientation. 226 Second, this amendment
would provide increased protections in light of current efforts to eliminate
protections against discrimination. 227 Finally, an amendment would

IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2.
See IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2 (urging that “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” be
added to the list of protected groups). The proposed amendments are italicized and are the
contribution of the author.
226
See supra Section III.C.1 (analyzing the level of scrutiny the court uses when looking at
discrimination based on sexual orientation, which is likely rational basis).
227
See supra Section III.C.3 (reviewing the various legal fights and attacks occurring
between the religious freedom proponents and the LGBT community).
224
225
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provide the LGBT community with the same protections currently given
to people based on race, religion, sex, etc., no more and no less.228
First, as discussed in Part III.C, the proponents of religious liberties
and freedom would likely win the discrimination debate in a court of law.
Unlike Colorado, the LGBT community currently lacks protections that
would allow LGBT individuals to fight their way up to the United States
Supreme Court.229 For this reason, it is important to amend the Indiana
Civil Rights Act and include “sexual orientation” and “gender identity”
as protected categories so the LGBT community has at least some platform
on which to fight.230 The counterargument, of course, comes from the
religious liberties proponents, who feel their rights are also being
violated.231 The issue here is a balancing of rights, and the right to “access
to public conveniences and accommodations” for the LGBT community
should prevail.
Second, including “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” to the
list of protected groups is important based on current legitimate
discrimination, or attempts to discriminate, because of these
characteristics. There are ongoing attempts to eliminate the limited
protections currently provided to the LGBT community, as discussed in
Section III.C.3 of this Note.232 Amending the Indiana Civil Rights Act
would provide these citizens with a platform on which to challenge these
various forms of discrimination.233 One may argue that the LGBT
community does not need these protections to the same extent that other
citizens need these protections due to race, gender, or religion. 234
However, history has shown that discrimination in Indiana based on
sexual orientation and gender identity is a real and legitimate issue, 235 and
228
See supra Part II.D (describing some of the protections provided by the Indiana Civil
Rights Act, specifically “access to public conveniences and accommodations”).
229
See, e.g., Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 279 (Colo. App. 2015), cert.
granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290
(June 26, 2017) (allowing a same-sex couple to file a complaint and win in state court because
Colorado had protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation).
230
See IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2.
231
See, e.g., Verified Compl., Ind. Family Inst., supra note 74 (challenging the “fix” to RFRA
and various local LGBT protections in Indiana as unconstitutional).
232
See supra Section III.C.3 (outlining the various attempts in Indiana to limit protections
for the LGBT community).
233
See, e.g., Mullins, 370 P.3d at 279 (agreeing that the anti-discrimination protections
provided by Colorado were a platform upon which citizens can sue).
234
See, e.g., Lauren R. Deitrich, Note, Transgender and the Judiciary: An Argument to Extend
Batson Challenges to Transgender Individuals, 50 VAL. U. L. REV. 719, 755 (2016) (encouraging
that courts should reassess the standard of review based on the definition of “immutable,”
even though the courts currently do not recognize “transgender” as an immutable trait).
235
See, e.g., Box, supra note 145, at 995–98 (providing various instances where LGBT
discrimination resulted in economic impact). See also S.B. 100, 119th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg.
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amending the Civil Rights Act would prevent this discrimination from
continuing.
Finally, amending Indiana’s Civil Rights Act and including “sexual
orientation” and “gender identity” would provide LGBT citizens with the
same protections others receive.236 In particular, this would eliminate the
possibility of “segregation and separation” based on these
characteristics.237 Currently, protected groups cannot be denied “access
to public conveniences and accommodations” based solely on their
protected characteristic.238 The LGBT community in Indiana is not
provided this luxury, and it is in the interest of fairness and justice that the
LGBT community should receive these protections in light of current
discrimination.239 Amending the Civil Rights Act and including language
is a better solution than proposing new legislation based on
counterarguments. Legislation created specifically to protect the LGBT
community could result in negative responses by those groups currently
protected by the Indiana Civil Rights Act. 240 By simply amending the Act
as it stands, the LGBT community would avoid possible opposition by
these minority groups, who would likely view this new legislation as
unfair or as providing increased protections to just one group. 241
V. CONCLUSION
Indiana needs statewide, comprehensive protections for its LGBT
citizens. This can be achieved by simply amending Indiana’s Civil Rights
Act, Ind. Code § 22-9-1-2, and including the terms “sexual orientation”
and “gender identity” to the list of protected groups. This solution is
similar to that of states like Colorado, who have successfully limited
discrimination by providing their citizens statewide protections.
Currently, the LGBT community in Indiana is protected only by a
patchwork of protections, and therefore, members of the LGBT
community are susceptible to discrimination. An equal protection claim
Sess. (Ind. 2016) (noting a Senate Bill in Indiana that failed, but would have eliminated local
protections for the LGBT community). See also Kim, supra note 60 (reporting an Indiana pizza
restaurant’s refusal to serve a same-sex wedding, citing RFRA as its justification).
236
See supra Part II.D (identifying various protections provided to listed groups under the
Indiana Civil Rights Act).
237
See IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2(a).
238
See IND. CODE § 22-9-1-3 (“‘Public accommodation’ means any establishment that caters
or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public.”).
239
See, e.g., Box, supra note 145, at 995–98.
240
See Robinson, supra note 42, at 172 (observing that while groups based on race and
national origin are entitled to strict scrutiny under the law, an animus review may actually
be more beneficial than the so-called strict scrutiny analysis).
241
See Robinson, supra note 42, at 173.
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is insufficient to protect these citizens from discrimination; therefore, a
cause of action provided by Indiana is necessary. Unfortunately, political
undertakings by Indiana’s governor and various courts have proven that
not all discrimination is equal under the law. As a result, the court applies
a higher standard for religious freedom protections than it does for
discrimination based on sexual orientation. The religious liberties groups
would therefore win in a case such as Indiana Family Institute v. City of
Carmel, Indiana. There is an active effort by the religious liberties and
freedom groups in Indiana to prevent and eliminate protections for the
LGBT community.
Based on the discussion of standards applied by the Court, there is a
very real potential for LGBT protections against discrimination to be
limited even further. Finally, there are policy reasons for protecting LGBT
citizens in Indiana from discrimination. One such reason is economic,
especially based on the backlash from passage of RFRA. Another is based
on Colorado’s success in amending its Civil Rights Act to provide
protections. Therefore, Indiana should amend its Civil Rights Act and
include “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” to its list of protected
groups.
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